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Abstract We study situations of allocating positions to students based on pri-
orities. An example is the assignment ofmedical students to hospital residencies
on the basis of entrance exams. Formarkets without couples, e.g., for undergrad-
uate student placement, acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin in Econometrica
70:2489–2497, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples acyclicity is still
necessary, but not sufficient. A second necessary condition is priority-together-
ness of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is
called pt-acyclic.
For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we char-
acterize pt-acyclicity and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence
of a fair and efficient placement mechanism. If in addition to pt-acyclicity we
require reallocation- and vacancy-fairness for couples, the so-called dictator-
bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement
mechanism.
Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclic-
ity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement
mechanism.We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential
placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation.
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1 Introduction
We consider so-called house allocation or student placement problems. A stu-
dent placement problem is determined by a set of position types, the number of
available positions of each type (the quota), and the students’ strict preferences
over position types (e.g., a position type could be a house or a position at a uni-
versity or firm) and remaining unassigned. A (student) placement mechanism
assigns to any given student placement problem an allocation of the position
types to the students such that every student receives at most one position and
quotas are upper bounds. In contrast to a pure house allocation problem, where
an assignment is made on the basis of students’ preferences over position types
alone,1 we assume that in a student placement problem additional information
is available.2 For instance, college admissions of undergraduate students are
often based on rankings obtained from one or several entrance exams. Then
students who achieved higher test scores in the entrance exam of a certain col-
lege have higher priority for admission at that college than students with lower
test scores. This situation can be described as a strict priority ranking of individ-
uals for each position type. We call this collection of strict priority rankings a
“priority structure.” A placement mechanism “violates the priority of student i
for position x” if there exists a preference profile under which student i envies
student j who obtains x even though i has a higher priority for x than j. A place-
ment mechanism is fair if it never violates the specified priorities. Ergin (2002,
Theorem 1) shows that a fair placement mechanism is efficient if and only if the
priority structure is acyclic.
We also consider the student placement problem, but have inmind situations
where students may not only care about their own position, but also about the
position of their partners. The instance of couples may not be a prominent fea-
ture in undergraduate admissions, but it definitely is an issue for many couples
who search for their first professional position in the same labor market, for
instancemedical studentswho look for residencies.We show that in thepresence
of couples, acyclicity is still a necessary condition for a placement mechanism to
be fair and efficient, but it is not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). In order for a fair and
efficient placement mechanism to exist, the priority structure also has to satisfy
“priority-togetherness of couples” (Theorem 4.2). Loosely speaking, priority-
togetherness of a couple means that the members of the couple are ranked
1 Sometimes it is also assumed that exactly one position of each type is available. Some recent
articles on house allocation problems are Ehlers (2002), Ehlers et al. (2002), and Ehlers and Klaus
(2003, 2006a,b).
2 See, for instance, Balinski and Sönmez (1999), Ergin (2002), and Kesten (2006).
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“close enough together” in the priority ranking of all position types. A priority
structure is “pt-acyclic” if it satisfies acyclicity and priority-togetherness.
For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we char-
acterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for
the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in
addition to pt-acyclicity we require reallocation- and vacancy-fairness for cou-
ples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair
and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2).
Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity
may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mech-
anism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that
the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient
allocation (Theorem 5.3).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce student placement
problems with couples. In Sect. 3, we introduce efficiency, fairness, and acyclic-
ity. In Sect. 4, we study necessary conditions for the compatibility of fairness
and efficiency. Sect. 5 is devoted to sufficient conditions for the compatibility
of fairness and efficiency. In Sect. 5.1 we focus on placement problems when all
quotas are equal to one. In Sect. 5.2 we conclude with an extension of some of
the results from Sect. 5.1 to general student placement problems. The proofs of
all our results are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Student placement with couples
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} denote the set of students. We assume that N can be par-
titioned into a set of couples C = {c1, . . . , ck} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k},
ci = (2i − 1, 2i) and a set of single students S = {2k + 1, . . . ,n}.3 Hence for a
market with three couples and four single students,N = {1, . . . , 10} is composed
of C = {c1 = (1, 2), c2 = (3, 4), c3 = (5, 6)} and S = {7, 8, 9, 10}. If C = ∅, then
our model coincides, for instance, with the model analyzed by Ergin (2002).
Let X denote the finite set of position types that the students apply to. For
any x ∈ X, let qx ≥ 1 denote the number of available positions, the quota,
of position type x. Let q ≡ (qx)x∈X . Note that we simply refer to “position x”
when we mean one of the qx positions of position type x. Let 0 denote the
null position, which does not belong to X (“receiving the null position” means
“not receiving any position”). Since the null position is freely available, we set
q0 ≡ ∞.
Each single student s ∈ S has an individual strict, transitive, and complete
preference relation Rs over X ∪ {0}. Given x, y ∈ X ∪ {0}, x Ps y means that
student s strictly prefers x to y. Let RS denote the set of all linear orders
over X ∪ {0}. In other words, RS equals the set of single students’ preference
3 Note that all results can be straightforwardly extended to a model that includes triplets, quadru-
plets, etc.
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relations. Let RSS denote the set of all (preference) profiles RS = (Rs)s∈S such
that for all s ∈ S, Rs ∈ RS.
Each couple c ∈ C has an individual strict, transitive, and complete prefer-
ence relation Rc over all ordered pairs of feasible position type assignments
X ≡ [(X ∪ {0}) × (X ∪ {0})]\{(x, x) : x ∈ X and qx = 1}. To simplify notation,
whenever we denote a position type assignment (x, y) we always additionally
assume that (x, y) is feasible, i.e., (x, y) ∈ X . This also means that all statements
we make with respect to position type assignments only apply if the position
type assignments in question are feasible. Given c = (i, j), (x, y), and (x′, y′),
(x, y) Pc (x′, y′) means that couple c strictly prefers (x, y), where i is matched to
x and j is matched to y, to (x′, y′), where i is matched to x′ and j is matched to y′.
Let RC denote the set of all linear orders over X . In other words, RC equals the
set of couples’ preference relations. Let RCC denote the set of all (preference)
profiles RC = (Rc)c∈C such that for all c ∈ C, Rc ∈ RC.
We next introduce a subdomain of RC that allows us to relate a couple’s
preference relation to “individual preferences” of each member in a couple in a
consistent way. Loosely speaking, this is the case when the unilateral improve-
ment of one partner’s position is considered beneficial for the couple as well.
Couple c = (i, j) ∈ C has responsive preferences if there exist preferences
Ri,Rj ∈ RS such that for all x, y, z ∈ X ∪ {0}, [x Pi y implies (x, z) Pc (y, z)] and
[x Pj y implies (z, x) Pc (z, y)].4 If these associated individual preferences Ri and
Rj exist, then they are unique. Note that if a couple c = (i, j) has responsive
preferences, then one can easily derive the associated individual preferences Ri
and Rj. Let RRC ⊂ RC equal the set of couples’ possible responsive prefer-
ence relations. Let RRCC denote the set of all responsive (preference) profiles
RC = (Rc)c∈C such that for all c ∈ C, Rc ∈ RRC. For notational convenience
we define R ≡ RCC × RSS and RR ≡ RRCC × RSS.
Let x ∈ X. We call a linear order 	x over N a priority ordering for position
type x. A priority structure is a profile 	 = (	x)x∈X specifying for each position
type a priority ordering.
Since the set of students N, the set of position types X, their quotas q, and
the priority structure 	 are fixed, we denote a (student) placement problem by
the students’ preferences R = (RC,RS) ∈ R. We assume that the null position
is available in any placement problem.
When allocating positions each student either receives a “real position inX”
or the null position 0. The null position can be assigned to several students with-
out any restriction, but for all other positions the associated quotas are upper
bounds. Formally, an allocation for R is a list α = (αi)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N,
αi ∈ X ∪ {0}, and for all x ∈ X, |{i ∈ N : αi = x}| ≤ qx. Thus, an allocation is
by definition feasible. Note that not all available positions need to be assigned.
Given i ∈ N, we call αi the allotment of student i at α. Given c = (i, j) ∈ C, we
call αc ≡ (αi,αj) the allotment of couple c at α.
4 Klaus and Klijn (2005, 2007) and Klaus et al. (2006) use the same notion of responsiveness in the
context of two-sided matching. In Remark 5.2 we compare the role of responsiveness in two-sided
matching and student placement.
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A (student) placement mechanism is a function ϕ that assigns to each place-
ment problem R ∈ R an allocation ϕ(R).
3 Efficiency, fairness, and acyclicity
We are interested in student placement mechanisms that choose (Pareto) effi-
cient allocations.
Definition 3.1 (Efficiency)Aplacementmechanismϕ is efficient if for all R ∈ R,
there is no allocation α = (αi)i∈N for R such that for all p ∈ S ∪ C, αp Rp ϕp(R)
and for some q ∈ S ∪ C, αq Pq ϕq(R).
Next, we formulate the idea that an allocationmay “violate the priority struc-
ture.” First, we do so for single students. An allocation violates the priority of a
single student i ∈ S if there exists a position x such that student i has a higher
priority for x than one of the students assigned to it and student i prefers to
switch to position x.
Definition 3.2 (Fairness for single students; Balinski and Sönmez 1999) Given
a placement problem R ∈ R, i ∈ S, and a priority structure 	, an allocation α
for R violates the priority of single student i if there exist x ∈ X and k ∈ N\{i}
such that αk = x, i 	x k, and x Pi αi. A placement mechanism ϕ is fair for single
students if for all R ∈ R, ϕ(R) does not violate the priority of any single student.
Next, we list the three ways in which an allocation may violate the priority
of a couple c = (i, j) ∈ C:
(a) there exists a position x ∈ X such that one member of the couple, e.g.,
student i, has a higher priority for x than one of the students whose allot-
ment is x and who is not i’s partner and couple c prefers that i switches
to position x while j either keeps his/her allotment or switches to the null
position.
(b) there exists a position x ∈ X such that it is the allotment of one member
of the couple, e.g., student j, the other member of the couple i has a higher
priority for x than j, and couple c prefers that i switches to position x and
j switches to the null position.
(c) there exist positions x, y ∈ X (possibly of the same type) and two stu-
dents k, l ∈ N (possibly k = j or l = i) such that k’s allotment is x, l’s
allotment is y, i has a higher priority for x than k, j has a higher priority
for y than l, and couple c prefers that i switches to x and j switches to y.5
5 The main idea of a fair allocation is that no single student (couple) can justifiably appeal for
another position (assignment of positions) that would make him/her (it) better off. For single stu-
dents only a position that is ranked higher than the allotment will make him/her better off. A couple
has various possibilities to improve its allotment: one or both partners could change their positions,
one partner could change his/her position while the other partner switches to the null position at
the same time, or one partner changes his/her position while the other partner receives his/her
previous position. Here we only consider violations of a couple’s priorities that would lead to a
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Definition 3.3 (Fairness for couples)Given aplacement problemR∈R, (i, j)∈C,
and a priority structure 	, an allocation α for R violates the priority of couple
(i, j) if
(a.1) there exist x ∈ X and k ∈ N\{i, j} such that αk = x, i 	x k, and
[(x,αj) P(i,j) (αi,αj) or (x, 0) P(i,j) (αi,αj)], or
(a.2) there exist x ∈ X and k ∈ N\{i, j} such that αk = x, j 	x k, and
[(αi, x) P(i,j) (αi,αj) or (0, x) P(i,j) (αi,αj)], or
(b.1) there exists x ∈ X such that αj = x, i 	x j, and (x, 0) P(i,j) (αi, x), or
(b.2) there exists x ∈ X such that αi = x, j 	x i, and (0, x) P(i,j) (x,αj), or
(c) there exist x, y ∈ X and k, l ∈ N, k = l, such that αk = x, αl = y, i 	x k,
j 	y l, and (x, y) P(i,j) (αi,αj).
A placement mechanism ϕ is fair for couples if for all R ∈ R, ϕ(R) does not
violate the priority of any couple.
Definition 3.4 (Fairness) A placement mechanism is fair if it is fair for single
students and couples.
We next introduce an acyclicity condition, due to Ergin (2002), that turns out
to be crucial for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism.
Definition 3.5 (Cycles and acyclicity)Given a priority structure	, a cycle is con-
stituted of distinct x, y ∈ X and i, j,k ∈ N such that the following two conditions
are satisfied:
cycle condition: i 	x j 	x k and k 	y i and
c-scarcity condition: there exist disjoint sets Nx,Ny ⊆ N\{i, j,k} (possibly
Nx = ∅ or Ny = ∅) such that Nx ⊆ {l ∈ N : l 	x j}, Ny ⊆ {l ∈ N : l 	y i},
|Nx| = qx − 1, and |Ny| = qy − 1.
A priority structure is acyclic if no cycles exist.
If quotas are all equal to 1, then the cycle condition is sufficient to establish
the existence of a cycle. For other quotas, the c-scarcity condition limits the
definition of a cycle to cases where there indeed exist placement problems in R
such that students i, j, and k compete for position types x and y (in the absence
of this competition, e.g., because the quotas do in fact not limit the access of
the students to positions of type x and y, a cycle will not lead to the violation of
efficiency or the given priorities—see Ergin 2002, for further discussion).
In the sequel we will sometimes write “Dx” instead of “Definition x”.
better allotment for the couple because one or both partners receive positions for which they have
a higher priority and possibly one partner chooses the null position. Since students do not have
any property rights over positions, passing on a position to a partner or adopting a vacant position
may not be allowed for a couple and therefore violations that give better allotments conditioned
on such transactions are not considered in our basic fairness concept, but later in two extra fairness
conditions for couples (Definitions 5.4 and 5.5).
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4 Fairness and efficiency for student placement with couples: necessary
conditions
In the absence of couples, Ergin (2002) shows that the acyclicity of the priority
structure is a necessary and sufficient condition for a placement mechanism to
be fair and efficient. He shows that under the assumption of an acyclic priority
structure, the unique efficient placement mechanism that is fair can be found
using a simple adaptation of the so-called deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale
and Shapley 1962). Theorem 1 in Ergin (2002) implies the following result.
Corollary 4.1 (Ergin 2002) Let C = ∅.
A fair and efficient placement mechanism ϕ exists (and is unique) if and only if
	 is acyclic.
Our first result is that for placement problems with couples, acyclicity is still
a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient
placement mechanism.
Theorem 4.1 (Necessity of acyclicity)
(a) A placement mechanism ϕ is fair and efficient only if 	 is acyclic.
(b) The acyclicity of 	 is not a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair
and efficient placement mechanism ϕ.
In the proof of Theorem 4.1 (Appendix) we use only responsive preferences
for couples.Hence, Theorem4.1 remains valid if we restrict couples’ preferences
to be responsive.
Remark 4.1 In order to prove Theorem 4.1(a) we assume that acyclicity is vio-
lated and derive a contradiction to fairness and efficiency. For any violation
of acyclicity that only involves single students, the proof of Theorem 4.1(a)
essentially equals the proof of Corollary 4.1 (Ergin 2002,Theorem 1). However,
extending the proof to situations where couples are involved in a violation of
acyclicity requires substantial extra work. The key then is to define adequate
individual preferences not only for single students, but also for the members of
all couples and, in addition, corresponding couples’ preferences.
Next, in order for fairness and efficiency to be compatible, we need an addi-
tional condition on the priority structure: members of a couple have to be “close
enough” in the priority structure. In the following definition we formalize what
we mean by “close enough.”
Definition 4.1 (Priority-separation, priority-togetherness, andpt-acyclicity)Let
c = (i, j) ∈ C. Given a priority structure 	, couple c is priority-separated if there
exists x ∈ X and k ∈ N such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
weak priority-separation
(i) if i 	x j, then i 	x k 	x j, and
(ii) if j 	x i, then j 	x k 	x i, and
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ps-scarcity condition
there exists a set N¯x ⊆ N\{i, j,k} (possibly N¯x = ∅) such that
(i) if i 	x j, then N¯x ⊆ {l ∈ N : l 	x j} and |N¯x| = qx − 1, and
(ii) if j 	x i, then N¯x ⊆ {l ∈ N : l 	x i} and |N¯x| = qx − 1.
A priority structure satisfies priority-togetherness (of couples) if no couple is
priority-separated. A priority structure is pt-acyclic if it is acyclic and satisfies
priority-togetherness.
If quotas are all equal to 1, then weak priority-separation is sufficient to
define priority-separation of couples. For other quotas, the ps-scarcity condi-
tion limits the definition of priority-separation to cases where there indeed exist
placement problems in R such that couple c and student k compete for position
type x (in the absence of this competition, e.g., because the quotas do in fact
not limit the access of the students to position type x, a priority-separation will
not lead to the violation of efficiency or the given priorities).
Theorem 4.2 (Necessity of pt-Acyclicity) A placement mechanism ϕ is fair and
efficient only if 	 is pt-acyclic.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 4.2 (Appendix) we use only responsive pref-
erences for couples. Hence, Theorem 4.2 remains valid if we restrict couples’
preferences to be responsive.
5 Fairness and efficiency for student placement with couples: sufficiency and
uniqueness
Our next goal is to introduce a fair and efficient placement mechanism for
pt-acyclic priority structures. First we show that any priority structure defines
in a natural way a partition of the students. As will turn out, the structure of the
partition induced by a pt-acyclic priority structure makes it possible to define
fair and efficient placement mechanisms.
Given position type x ∈ X and a subset N′ ⊆ N of students, let top(	x,N′)
denote the student with the highest priority for position type x among the stu-
dents in N′, i.e., i = top(	x,N′) if and only if i ∈ N′ and for all j ∈ N′\{i},
i 	x j. Given a subset N′ ⊆ N of students, let top(N′) denote the set of students
with the highest priority for some position type among the students in N′, i.e.,
top(N′) ≡ ⋃x∈X top(	x,N′). Using this notation, we define a partition of the
set of all students N that is induced by a (not necessarily pt-acyclic) priority
structure 	:
S1 denotes the set of students who have the highest priority for some position
type; S2 denotes the set of students in the remaining set of students N\S1 who
now have the highest priority for some position type, etc. Given Sk, we interpret
the index k as a level of priority: students in S1 have the highest possible priority,
students in S2 have the next highest priority, etc.
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Definition 5.1 (Partition S induced by 	) Let S1 ≡ top(N) and for k > 1, if
N\⋃k−1l=1 Sl = ∅, then Sk ≡ top
(
N\⋃k−1l=1 Sl
)
= ∅. Hence, there exists p ≥ 1,
p < ∞, such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,p}, Sk = ∅, and N\
[⋃p
l=1 Sl
] = ∅. By
S ≡ {S1, . . . ,Sp}, we define the partition (of N) induced by 	, i.e., N =
⋃p
l=1 Sl
and for k,k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,p}, k = k′, Sk ∩ Sk′ = ∅.
5.1 Sufficiency and uniqueness when all quotas are equal to one
Throughout this subsection we assume that for all x ∈ X, qx = 1 and refer to
position x instead of position type x. For this special situation, pt-acyclicity is
equivalent to the following.
Definition 5.2 (pt-acyclicity when all quotas are equal to one) A priority struc-
ture 	 is pt-acyclic if it has neither cycles nor weakly priority-separated couples:
no cycles: there exist no i, j,k ∈ N and x, y ∈ X such that i 	x j 	x k and
k 	y i and
no weak priority-separation: there exist no (i, j) ∈ C, k ∈ N, and x ∈ X such
that i 	x k 	x j or j 	x k 	x i.
The next lemma describes the implications that pt-acyclicity of a priority
structure has on its induced partition. First, (ia) each component of the parti-
tion either contains one or two students, that is, at most two students share the
same level of priority. Second, (ib) if two students i, j share the same level of
priority, then they are neighbors in the priority structure, i.e., for all positions,
either i is ranked just after j or j is ranked just after i. Finally, members of a
couple c = (i, j) either (iia) share the same level of priority or (iib and iic)
they do not share the level of priority with any other student(s), but they have
consecutive levels of priority.
Lemma 5.1 Priority structure 	 is pt-acyclic if and only if partition S =
{S1, . . . ,Sp} has the following properties:
(i) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,p},
(a) |Sk| ≤ 2,
(b) if Sk = {i, j}, i = j, then for any x ∈ X,[
i = top
(
x,N\⋃k−1l=1 Sl
)
implies j= top
(
x,N\
[⋃k−1
l=1 Sl ∪ {i}
])]
and
(ii) for all c = (i, j) ∈ C, if for k ∈ {1, . . . ,p}, Sk ∩ {i, j} = ∅, then
(a) Sk = {i, j}, or
(b) Sk ∪ Sk−1 = {i, j}, or
(c) Sk ∪ Sk+1 = {i, j}.
In the proof of Lemma 5.1 (Appendix) we show that condition (i) characterizes
the acyclicity of priority structure 	, and that given acyclicity, condition (ii)
characterizes priority-togetherness. The following direct implications of condi-
tion (i) of Lemma 5.1 turn out to be useful later on.
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Lemma 5.2 Let S be the partition induced by 	 and assume S satisfies (i) in
Lemma 5.1.
(a) Let x ∈ X and i, i¯, i′ ∈ N be such that i 	x i¯ 	x i′. Furthermore, let k,k′ ∈
{1, . . . ,p} be such that i ∈ Sk and i′ ∈ Sk′ . Then, k < k′.
(b) If i ∈ Sk, i′ ∈ Sk′ , k,k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,p}, and k < k′, then for all x ∈ X, i 	x i′.
We can now use partition S to define the dictator-bidictator deferred accep-
tance placementmechanism, theDB placementmechanism for short. Informally,
the DB placement mechanism works as follows. Determine who has the highest
level of priority. If a single student has the highest priority, then he/she receives
his/her most preferred position. If two single students share the highest pri-
ority, then either they receive their most preferred positions or, in case of a
conflict, the priority decides who gets his/her most preferred position and who
gets his/her second most preferred position. If a member of a couple has the
highest level of priority or a couple shares the highest level of priority, then the
couple receives its most preferred position assignment. Repeat this step with
the remaining students and positions, i.e., determine who has the next highest
level of priority, etc.
Let Y ⊆ X be a set of positions. Let s ∈ S and Rs ∈ RS. Then top(Rs,Y)
denotes student s’s most preferred position in Y ∪ {0}, i.e., y = top(Rs,Y) ∈
Y ∪ {0} if and only if for all x ∈ Y ∪ {0}, x = y, y Ps x. Let c ∈ C and Rc ∈
RC. Then top(Rc,Y) denotes couple c’s most preferred position assignment in
Y ≡ [(Y ∪ {0}) × (Y ∪ {0})]\{(y, y) : y ∈ Y}, i.e., (y, y′) = top(Rc,Y) ∈ Y if and
only if for all (x, x′) ∈ Y , (x, x′) = (y, y′), (y, y′) Pc (x, x′).
Definition 5.3 (The dictator-bidictator (DB) placement mechanism ϕS) Let 	
be a pt-acyclic priority structure that induces partition S = {S1, . . . ,Sp}. Given
R ∈ R, we calculate ϕS(R) as follows. Set k = 1 and X1 ≡ X. As long as k ≤ p,
do Step k:
(a) Sk = {s} and s ∈ S: ϕSs (R) ≡ top(Rs,Xk), Xk+1 ≡ Xk\{ϕSs (R)}, and set
k = k + 1.
If a single student has the highest priority for all remaining real positions in
Xk, he/she chooses his/her favorite position in Xk ∪ {0}. The set of unassigned
real positions equals Xk+1.
(b) Sk = {s}, s ∈ S, and Sk ∪Sk+1 = {s, s′} such that c = (s, s′) ∈ C or c = (s′, s) ∈
C: ϕSc (R) ≡ top(Rc,Xk), Xk+2 ≡ Xk\{ϕSs (R),ϕSs′ (R)}, and set k = k + 2.
If the member of a couple has the highest priority for all remaining real posi-
tions in Xk, then the couple chooses its most favorite position assignment in Xk.
The set of unassigned real positions equals Xk+2.
(c) Sk = {s, s′} and s, s′ ∈ S:
(c.1) if top(Rs,Xk) = top(Rs′ ,Xk) or top(Rs,Xk) = top(Rs′ ,Xk) = 0, ϕSs (R)≡
top(Rs,Xk), ϕSs′ (R) ≡ top(Rs′ ,Xk), Xk+1 ≡ Xk\{ϕSs (R),ϕSs′ (R)}, and set k =
k + 1.
(c.2) if top(Rs,Xk) = top(Rs′ ,Xk) ≡ xˆ ∈ X and s 	xˆ s′, ϕSs (R) ≡ top(Rs,Xk),
ϕSs′ (R) ≡ top(Rs′ ,Xk\{ϕSs (R)}), Xk+1 ≡ Xk\{ϕSs (R),ϕSs′ (R)}, and set k = k + 1.
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(c.3) if top(Rs,Xk) = top(Rs′ ,Xk) ≡ xˆ ∈ X and s′ 	xˆ s, ϕSs′ (R) ≡ top(Rs′ ,Xk),
ϕSs (R) ≡ top(Rs,Xk\{ϕSs′ (R)}), Xk+1 ≡ Xk\{ϕSs (R),ϕSs′ (R)}, and set k = k + 1.
If two single students share the highest priorities for all remaining real posi-
tions in Xk, then there are two possibilities. First, if feasible, both of them choose
their favorite position in Xk ∪ {0}; see (c.1). Second, if both of them prefer the
same real position in Xk, then the student with the higher priority receives it and
the remaining student is assigned his/her second best position in Xk ∪ {0}; see
(c.2) and (c.3). The set of unassigned real positions equals Xk+1.
(d) Sk = {s, s′} and c = (s, s′) ∈ C or c = (s′, s) ∈ C: ϕSc (R) ≡ top(Rc,Xk),
Xk+1 ≡ Xk\{ϕSs (R),ϕSs′ (R)}, and set k = k + 1.
If the two members of a couple together have the highest priority for all
remaining real positions in Xk, then the couple chooses its most favorite position
assignment in Xk. The set of unassigned real positions equals Xk+1.
The allocation ϕS(R) is obtained after at most p steps.
Example 5.1 (An application of the DB placement mechanism) Let N =
{1, . . . , 8} be such that C = {c1 = (1, 2), c2 = (3, 4)} and S = {5, 6, 7, 8}; and
X = {x1, . . . , x7} with quota 1 for each position type. We depict the pt-acyclic
priority structure 	 and preference profile R ∈ R in the two tables below.
	x1 	x2 	x3 	x4 	x5 	x6 	x7
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
2 1 1 2 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 1
7 5 7 5 5 5 7
5 7 5 7 7 7 5
4 4 4 4 4 4 4
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
8 8 8 8 8 8 8
and
Rc1 Rc2 R5 R6 R7 R8
(x3, x1) (x2, x1) x1 x3 x1 x1
(x1, x3) (x4, x5) x2 x1 x2 x2
(x2, x1) (x6, x5) x3 x2 x3 x3
(x1, x2) (x7, x5) x4 x4 x4 x4
(x3, x2) (0, x5) x5 x7 x5 x5
(x2, x3) (x5, x7) x6 0 x6 x6
(x3, 0) (x4, x7) x7 x5 x7 x7
(0, x3) (x6, x7) 0 x6 0 0
(x1, 0) (0, x7)
(0, x1) (0, 0)
· · · · · ·
In the table denoting priority structure 	, students with higher priority for a
position are denoted above students with lower priorities, e.g., 6 	x1 2 	x1 1 	x1
7 	x1 5 	x1 4 	x1 3 	x1 8. In the table denoting preference profile R, position
assignments that are more preferred are denoted above less preferred position
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assignments, e.g., (x3, x1)Rc1 (x1, x3)Rc1 (x2, x1)Rc1 (x1, x2)Rc1 (x3, x2)Rc1 . . . or
x1 R5 x2 R5 x3 R5 x4 R5 x5 R5 . . ..
Priority structure	 induces partition S = {S1,S2,S3,S4,S5,S6}with S1 = {6},
S2 = {1, 2},S3 = {5, 7},S4 = {4},S5 = {3}, andS6 = {8}. Note thatS4∪S5 = {3, 4}
consists of couple c2. We now calculate ϕS(R). Recall that X1 = X.
Step 1: S1 = {6} and 6 ∈ S: ϕS6 (R) = x3 and X2 = {x1, x2, x4, x5, x6, x7}.
Step 2: S2 = {1, 2} and (1, 2) ∈ C: ϕSc1(R) = (x2, x1) and X3 = {x4, x5, x6, x7}.
Step 3: S3 = {5, 7} and 5, 7 ∈ S: ϕS5 (R) = x4, ϕS7 (R) = x5, and X4 = {x6, x7}.
Step 4: S4 = {4}, S5 = {3}, and (3, 4) ∈ C: ϕSc2(R) = (x6, x7) and X6 = ∅.
Step 6: S6 = {8} and 8 ∈ S: ϕS8 (R) = 0 and X7 = ∅.
Hence, ϕS(R) = (x2, x1, x6, x7, x4, x3, x5, 0).
Our next result is that for pt-acyclic priority structures the DB placement
mechanism is fair and efficient.
Theorem 5.1 (Quotas equal to one: sufficiency of pt-acyclicity) Let 	 be a
pt-acyclic priority structure. Then, the DB placement mechanism ϕS is fair and
efficient.
Remark 5.1 Theorem 5.1 is implied by one of our later results for general place-
ment problems (Theorem 5.3). In the proof of Theorem 5.3 we use a result from
Ergin (2002). However, a self-contained proof of Theorem 5.1 is available from
any of the authors upon request.
The following two examples show exactly why pt-acyclicity is not strong
enough to obtain the DB Placement Mechanism as the unique fair and efficient
mechanism.
Example 5.2 (Fairness, efficiency, and reallocation) Let N = {1, 2, 3} be such
that C = {c = (1, 2)} and S = {3}; and X = {x, y, z} with quota 1 for each
position type. Let 	 be such that for all x′ ∈ X, 1 	x′ 2 	x′ 3. Consider
Rc ∈ RRC and R3 ∈ RS such that (x, y) Pc (y, z) Pc . . . and x P3 y P3 z P3 0,
where the “tail” of Rc, denoted by “. . .”, can be any fixed linear order of the
remaining position assignments such that couple c’s preferences are responsive.
Let R = (Rc,R3). It is easy to check that Si = {i} and hence ϕS(R) = (x, y, z).
However, allocation α = (y, z, x) is also fair and efficient.
Suppose that we allow couples to reallocate positions among themselves.
Then, we could argue that allocation α “violates the priority of couple c after
reallocation” since student 1 can pass on position y to his/her partner and then
complain that his/her priority for position x is violated because 1 	x 3. Note that
by passing position y to student 2, student 3’s priority is not violated because
2 	y 3 (since student 2 is student 1’s partner, 1 	y 2 is not relevant).
Example 5.3 (Fairness, efficiency, and vacancies) Let N = {1, 2, 3} be such that
C = {c = (1, 2)} and S = {3}; and X = {x, y, z,q} with quota 1 for each position
type. Let 	 be such that for all x′ ∈ X, 1 	x′ 2 	x′ 3. Consider Rc ∈ RC and
R3 ∈ RS such that (x, y)Pc (z,q)Pc . . . and xP3 yP3 zP3 qP3 0, where the “tail”
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of Rc, denoted by “. . .”, can be any fixed linear order of the remaining position
assignments. Let R = (Rc,R3). It is easy to check that Si = {i} and hence
ϕS(R) = (x, y, z). However, allocation α = (z,q, x) is also fair and efficient.
Suppose that we allow students to occupy a vacant position. Then, we could
argue that allocation α “violates the priority of couple c when taking into
account vacancies” since student 2 can claim position y and then his/her partner
can complain that his/her priority for position x is violated because 1 	x 3. Note
that student 2’s occupation of position y does not violate student 3’s priority.
Definition 5.4 (Reallocation-fairness for couples) Given a placement problem
R ∈ R, i ∈ N, and a priority structure 	, an allocation α for R violates the
priority of couple (i, j) ∈ C after reallocation if
(r.1) αi ∈ X and there exist x ∈ X and k ∈ N\{i, j} such that αk = x, i 	x k, and
(x,αi) P(i,j) (αi,αj) or
(r.2) αj ∈ X and there exist x ∈ X and k ∈ N\{i, j} such that αk = x, j 	x k, and
(αj, x) P(i,j) (αi,αj).
A placement mechanism ϕ is reallocation-fair (for couples) if for all R ∈ R,
ϕ(R) does not violate the priority of any couple after reallocation.
Definition 5.5 (Vacancy-fairness for couples) Given a placement problem
R ∈ R, i ∈ N, and a priority structure 	, an allocation α for R violates the
priority of couple (i, j) ∈ C when taking vacancies into account if
(v.1) there exist x ∈ X, k ∈ N\{i, j}, and v ∈ X\{αl : l ∈ N} such that αk = x,
i 	x k, and (x, v) P(i,j) (αi,αj) or
(v.2) there exist x ∈ X, k ∈ N\{i, j}, and v ∈ X\{αl : l ∈ N} such that αk = x,
j 	x k, and (v, x) P(i,j) (αi,αj).
A placement mechanism ϕ is vacancy-fair (for couples) if for all R ∈ R, ϕ(R)
does not violate the priority of any couple when taking vacancies into account.
It is easy to check that the DB placement mechanism is reallocation- and
vacancy-fair (for pt-acyclic priority structures). Given a pt-acyclic priority struc-
ture a reallocation- and vacancy-fair placement mechanism is fair and efficient
if and only if it is the DB placement mechanism.
Theorem 5.2 (Quotas equal to one: uniqueness of the DB placement mech-
anism) Let 	 be a pt-acyclic priority structure. Let ϕ be a reallocation- and
vacancy-fair placement mechanism. Then, ϕ is fair and efficient if and only if
ϕ = ϕS .
Note that the proof (Appendix) of Theorem 5.2 remains the same for the
domain of responsive preferences. Hence, Theorem 5.2 remains valid if we
restrict couples’ preferences to be responsive.
In Example 5.2 we exhibit a placement problem with responsive preferences
such that there is an allocation that violates the priority of a couple after reallo-
cation. In Example 5.3 we cannot exhibit a placement problem with responsive
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preferences such that there is an allocation that violates the priority of a couple
when taking vacancies into account. The following result explains why.
Proposition 5.1 Let ϕ be a placement mechanism on the domain of responsive
preferences RR. If ϕ is fair and efficient (on RR), then ϕ is also vacancy-fair (on
RR).
Corollary 5.1 Let 	 be a pt-acyclic priority structure. Let ϕ be a reallocation-fair
placement mechanism on the domain of responsive preferences RR. Then, ϕ is
fair and efficient (on RR) if and only if ϕ = ϕS (on RR).
5.2 Sufficiency: the general case
First, we demonstrate with three examples that if quotas are not all equal to one,
then pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient
placement mechanism. All three examples are minimal in the sense that the
number of students and couples are as small as possible.
Example 5.4 (pt-acyclic priorities and no fair and efficient allocation I) LetN =
{1, 2, 3} be such that C = {c1 = (1, 2)} and S = {3}; and X = {x, y} with qx = 1
and qy = 2. Let 	 be such that 1 	x 2 	x 3 and 1 	y 3 	y 2. Note that 	 is
pt-acyclic. ConsiderRc1 ∈ RC andR3 ∈ RS such that (y, y)Pc1 (x, y)Pc1 (0, 0)Pc1
. . . and y P3 0 P3 x, where the “tail” of Rc1 , denoted by “. . .”, can be any
fixed linear order of the remaining position type assignments. The only effi-
cient allocations for placement problem R = (Rc1 ,R3) are α = ((y, y), 0) and
β = ((x, y), y). Since 3 	y 2 and yP3 0, α violates the priority of student 3 (D3.2).
Furthermore, since 1 	y 3 and (y, y) Pc1 (x, y), β violates the priority of couple
c1 (D3.3, a.1).
Example 5.5 (pt-acyclic priorities and no fair and efficient allocation II) Let
N = {1, 2, 3, 4} be such that C = {c1 = (1, 2), c2 = (3, 4)}; and X = {x, y}
with qx = 3 and qy = 1. Let 	 be such that 1 	x 3 	x 2 	x 4 and 2 	y
1 	y 4 	y 3. Note that 	 is pt-acyclic. Consider Rc1 ,Rc2 ∈ RC such that
(x, x)Pc1 (y, x)Pc1 (0, 0)Pc1 . . . and (x, x)Pc2 (y, x)Pc2 (0, 0)Pc2 . . ., where the “tails”
of Rc1 and Rc2 , denoted by “. . .”, can be any fixed linear order of the remain-
ing position type assignments. The only efficient allocations for this placement
problem R = (Rc1 ,Rc2) are α = ((x, x), (y, x)) and β = ((y, x), (x, x)). Since
3 	x 2 and (x, x) Pc2 (y, x), α violates the priority of couple c2 (D3.3, a.1). Fur-
thermore, since 1 	x 3 and (x, x) Pc1 (y, x), β violates the priority of couple c1
(D3.3, a.1).
Examples 5.4 and 5.5 suggest that the reason for the incompatibility of fair-
ness and efficiency is that a couple is weakly priority-separated (D4.1). The
following example demonstrates that excluding weak priority-separation of all
couples does not guarantee the existence of a fair and efficient allocation.
Example 5.6 (pt-acyclic priorities and no fair and efficient allocation III) Let
N = {1, 2, 3, 4} be such that C = {c1 = (1, 2), c2 = (3, 4)}; and X = {x, y} with
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qx = qy = 2. Let 	 be such that 1 	x 2 	x 3 	x 4 and 3 	y 4 	y 1 	y 2.
Note that 	 is pt-acyclic and no couple is weakly priority-separated. Con-
sider Rc1 ,Rc2 ∈ RC such that (y, y) Pc1 (x, x) Pc1 (x, 0) Pc1 (0, 0) Pc1 . . . and
(x, y) Pc2 (x, 0) Pc2 (0, 0) Pc2 . . ., where the “tails” of Rc1 and Rc2 , denoted by
“. . .”, can be any fixed linear order of the remaining position type assignments.
The only efficient allocations for this placement problem R = (Rc1 ,Rc2) are
α = ((y, y), (x, 0)) and β = ((x, 0), (x, y)). Since 4 	y 1 and (x, y) Pc2 (x, 0), α
violates the priority of couple c2 (D3.3, a.2). Furthermore, since 2 	x 3 and
(x, x) Pc1 (x, 0), β violates the priority of couple c1 (D3.3, a.2).
Next, we strengthen pt-acyclicity in order to prevent incompatibilities as
described in Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. We impose a restriction on pt-acyclic
priority structures that will allow us to extend the DB placement mechanism
to the general case with arbitrary quotas. For that purpose, we introduce the
notion of strong acyclicity of the partition induced by a priority structure 	.
First, (i) members of a couple c = (i, j) either share the same level of priority
or they do not share the level of priority with any other student(s), but they
have consecutive levels of priority. Second, (ii) if student i has a higher level of
priority than student j, then student i has a higher priority for all position types
than student j.
Definition 5.6 (Strongly pt-acyclic partition S induced by 	) Let 	 be a pt-acy-
clic priority structure and S ≡ {S1, . . . ,Sp} be the partition (of N) induced by 	.
Partition S is strongly pt-acyclic if
(i) for each couple c = (i, j) there is k ∈ {1, . . . ,p} with Sk = {i, j} or Sk ∪ Sk+1 =
{i, j}, and
(ii) for all k,k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,p} such that k < k′: if i ∈ Sl and j ∈ Sk′ , then for all
x ∈ X, i 	x j.
In Example 5.4, the partition induced by 	 equals S1 = {1} and S2 = {2, 3},
violating (i) in Definition 5.6. In Example 5.5 the partition induced by 	 equals
S1 = {1, 2} and S2 = {3, 4}, violating (ii) in Definition 5.6. In Example 5.6 the
partition induced by 	 equals S1 = {1, 3} and S2 = {2, 4}, violating (i) and (ii)
in Definition 5.6.
Examples 5.4 and 5.5 demonstrate that conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition
of a strong pt-acyclic partition are not vacuous. Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, however,
show that when all quotas are equal to one, any pt-acyclic priority structure
induces a strongly pt-acyclic partition.
We will use the following notation to discuss implications of a strongly
pt-acyclic partition. Let c = (i, j) ∈ C, c′ = (i′, j′) ∈ C, and x ∈ X. Denote
c 	x c′ if and only if [i 	x i′, i 	x j′, j 	x i′, and j 	x j′]. Furthermore, denote
c 	 c′ if and only if for all x ∈ X, c 	x c′. The following direct implications of a
strongly pt-acyclic partition S turn out to be useful later on.
Lemma 5.3 (Implications of a strongly pt-acyclic partition) Let 	 be a pt-acy-
clic priority structure that induces a strongly pt-acyclic partition S = {S1, . . . ,Sp}.
Then,
192 B. Klaus, F. Klijn
(a) no couple is weakly priority-separated (D4.1);
(b) all couples have “the same sequence of priorities for all position types,” i.e.,
for c, c′ ∈ C, either c 	 c′ or c′ 	 c. We assume without loss of generality
that c1 	 c2 	 . . . 	 ck;
(c) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,p}, either Sk ⊆ S or there exists c = (i, j) ∈ C such that
Sk = {i, j}, Sk−1 ∪ Sk = {i, j}, or Sk ∪ Sk+1 = {i, j}.
Before we introduce the so-called sequential (deferred acceptance) place-
ment mechanism, we introduce the concept of a reduced placement problem
and the deferred acceptance algorithm for single students.
Definition 5.7 (Reduced placement problems and the DA algorithm ϕ˜) Let
S′ ⊆ S and q ≥ q′ ≥ 0. For any R ∈ R, define RS′ ≡ (Ri)i∈S′ . Then, given place-
ment problem R ∈ R, we denote by (RS′ ,q′) the reduced placement problem
where position type quotas have been reduced to q′ and only students in S′ apply
for positions.
For any reduced placement problem (RS′ ,q′) we determine the allocation
ϕ˜(RS′ ,q′) using the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm of Gale and Shapley
(1962):
At the first step every student in N′ “proposes” to his/her favorite position
type in X ∪ {0}. For each position type x, the q′x applicants who have the highest
priority under 	x (none if q′x = 0 and all if there are fewer than q′x) are placed
on the waiting list of x, and the others are rejected. Every student who applies for
the null position is placed on its “waiting list.”
At any consecutive step every newly rejected student proposes to his/her next
best position type in X ∪{0}. For each position type x, the q′x applicants who have
the highest priority under 	x (none if q′x = 0 and all if there are fewer than q′x)
among the new applicants and those on the waiting list are placed on the new
waiting list and the others are rejected. Every student who applies for the null
position is placed on its “waiting list.”
The algorithm terminates when every student belongs to a waiting list. Then
positions of type x ∈ X ∪ {0} are assigned to the students on the waiting list of x.
We can now use the strongly pt-acyclic partition S and the deferred accep-
tance algorithm for reduced placement problems to define the sequential
deferred acceptance placement mechanism, sequential placement mechanism for
short. Informally, it works as follows. Determine who has the highest level of
priority. If a set of single students has the highest priority, then they receive
their position types according to the DA algorithm. If a member of a couple
has the highest level of priority or a couple shares the highest level of priority,
then the couple receives its most preferred position assignment. Repeat this
step with the remaining students and positions, i.e., determine who has the next
highest level of priority, etc.
Given a reduced quota vector q′ such that q ≥ q′ ≥ 0, a position type x ∈ X
is available if q′x ≥ 1. By X(q′) we denote the set of all available position
types at q′. Let s ∈ S and Rs ∈ RS. Then top(Rs,q′) denotes the student’s
most preferred available position type in X(q′) ∪ {0}, i.e., x = top(Rs,q′) if
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and only if for all y ∈ X(q′) ∪ {0}, y = x, x Ps y. Let c ∈ C and Rc ∈ RC.
Then top(Rc,q′) denotes the couple’s most preferred available position type
assignment in X (q′) ≡ [(X(q′) ∪ {0}) × (X(q′) ∪ {0})]\{(x, x) : q′x = 1}, i.e.,
(x, x′) = top(Rc,q′) ∈ X (q′) if and only if for all (y, y′) ∈ X (q′), (y, y′) = (x, x′),
(x, x′) Pc (y, y′).
Given a set of students S′ ⊆ S with allotments ϕS′(R) ≡ (ϕi(R))i∈S′ , assume
that q′ is a (reduced) quota vector for which the students’ allotments ϕS′(R) are
feasible, i.e., for all x ∈ X, |{s ∈ S′ : ϕs(R) = x}| ≤ q′x ≤ qx. Then, for all x ∈ X we
define q′x\ϕS′(R) ≡ q′x − |{s ∈ S′ : ϕs(R) = x}| and q′\ϕS′(R) ≡ (q′x\ϕS′(R))x∈X .
Hence, q′\ϕS′(R) denotes the reduced quota vector obtained by removing the
students’ allotments ϕS′(R) from the placement problem.
Given a couple c = (i, j) ∈ C with allotment ϕc(R) = (ϕi(R),ϕj(R)), assume
that q′ is a (reduced) quota vector for which the couple’s allotment ϕc(R) is fea-
sible, i.e., for all x ∈ X, |{k ∈ {i, j} : ϕk(R) = x}| ≤ q′x ≤ qx. Then, for all x ∈ X we
define q′x\ϕc(R) ≡ q′x − |{k ∈ {i, j} : ϕk(R) = x}| and q′\ϕc(R) ≡ (q′x\ϕc(R))x∈X .
Hence, q′\ϕc(R) denotes the reduced quota vector obtained by removing the
couple’s allotment ϕc(R) from the placement problem.
Definition 5.8 (The sequential placement mechanism ϕS) Let 	 be a pt-acyclic
priority structure that induces a strongly pt-acyclic partition S = {S1, . . . ,Sp}.
Given R ∈ R, we calculate ϕS(R) as follows. Set k = 1, N1 ≡ N, and q1 ≡ q. As
long as k ≤ p, do Step k:
(a) Sk ⊆ S: ϕSSk(R) ≡ ϕ˜(RSk ,qk), qk+1 ≡ qk\ϕSSk(R), Nk+1 ≡ Nk\Sk, and set
k = k + 1.
If a set of single students Sk share the highest priority for all remaining avail-
able position types given by qk, then the students’ assignments are determined
by applying the DA algorithm to the reduced placement problem where they are
the only applicants. After the students’ assignments are determined, the set of
remaining available positions is described by qk+1.
(b) Sk = {s}, s ∈ S, and Sk ∪Sk+1 = {s, s′} such that c = (s, s′) ∈ C or c = (s′, s) ∈
C: ϕSc (R) ≡ top(Rc,qk), qk+2 ≡ qk\ϕSc (R), Nk+2 ≡ Nk\{i, j}, and set k = k + 2.
If a member of a couple has the highest priority for all remaining available
position types given by qk, then the couple chooses its best pair of positions in
X (qk). After the couple’s assignment is determined, the set of remaining available
positions is described by qk+2.
(c) Sk = {s, s′} and c = (s, s′) ∈ C or c = (s′, s) ∈ C: ϕSc (R) ≡ top(Rc,qk),
qk+1 ≡ qk\ϕSc (R), Nk+1 ≡ Nk\{i, j}, and set k = k + 1.
If the members of a couple together have the highest priority for all remaining
available position types given by qk, then the couple chooses its best pair of posi-
tions in X (qk). After the couple’s assignment is determined, the set of remaining
available positions is described by qk+1.
The allocation ϕS(R) is obtained in at most p steps.
Note that when all quotas are equal to one, the sequential placement mech-
anism and the DB placement mechanism are identical.
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Example 5.7 (An application of the sequential placement mechanism) LetN =
{1, . . . , 8} be such that C = {c1 = (1, 2), c2 = (3, 4)} and S = {5, 6, 7, 8}; and
X = {x, y, z} with qx = qy = qz = 3. We depict the pt-acyclic priority structure
	 and preference profile R ∈ R in the two tables below.
	x 	y 	z
5 6 7
6 7 5
7 5 6
1 2 1
2 1 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
8 8 8
and
Rc1 Rc2 R5 R6 R7 R8
(x, x) (x, x) y x x x
(z, x) (z, x) x y y z
(x, z) (x, z) z z z 0
· · · (z, z) 0 0 0 y
· · ·
Priority structure	 induces the stronglypt-acyclic partitionS={S1,S2,S3,S4,S5}
with S1 = {5, 6, 7}, S2 = {1, 2}, S3 = {3}, S4 = {4}, and S5 = {8}. Note that
S4 ∪ S5 = {3, 4} consists of couple c2. We now calculate ϕS(R). Recall that
N1 = N and q1 ≡ q = (qx,qy,qz) = (3, 3, 3).
Step 1: S1 = {5, 6, 7} ⊆ S: ϕS5 (R) = y, ϕS6 (R) = x, ϕS7 (R) = x, N2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 8},
and q2 = (q2x,q2y,q2z) = (1, 2, 3).
Step 2: S2 = {1, 2} and c1 = (1, 2) ∈ C: ϕSc1(R) = (z, x), N3 = {3, 4, 8}, and
q3 = (q3x,q3y,q3z) = (0, 2, 2).
Step 3: S3 ∪ S4 = {3, 4} and c2 = (3, 4) ∈ C: ϕSc2(R) = (z, z), N5 = {8}, and
q5 = (q5x,q5y,q5z) = (0, 2, 0).
Step 5: S5 = {8} ⊆ S: ϕS8 (R) = 0.
Hence, ϕS(R) = (z, x, z, z, y, x, x, 0).
Our next result is that for pt-acyclic priority structures that induce strongly
pt-acyclic partitions the sequential placement mechanism is fair and efficient.
Theorem 5.3 (General quotas: sufficiency of a strongly pt-acyclic partition)Let
	 be a pt-acyclic priority structure that induces a strongly pt-acyclic partition.
Then, the sequential placement mechanism ϕS is fair and efficient.
Remark 5.2 (Responsiveness in student placement and two-sided matching)
The student placement model we consider and two-sided matching markets
(see Roth and Sotomayor 1990) are closely related. In our context of student
placement, we consider students’ preferences and a priority structure as inputs
and focus on fairness and efficiency. By contrast, a two-sided matching prob-
lem also consists of students’ preferences, but priorities over position types are
replaced by preferences over students or sets of students of the institutions that
offer the position types (e.g., universities, firms, or hospitals). An important
property for two-sided matching is stability: loosely speaking, an outcome or
matching is stable if there are no students (couples) and no institutions that are
notmatchedwith each other, but in fact would prefer to be.A key result (among
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many other results) for two-sidedmatching problems is that under the appropri-
ate substitutability or responsiveness condition stable matchings always exist;
see for instance Roth (1985, many-to-one matching without money), Kelso and
Crawford (1982, many-to-one matching with money), Alkan and Gale (2003,
many-to-many schedule matching), Klaus and Klijn (2005, many-to-one match-
ing with couples), and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005, two-sided matching with
contracts). More specifically, whenever couples with non-responsive prefer-
ences are present in a two-sided matching market, a stable outcome may not
exist; see Roth (1984) and Klaus and Klijn (2005). Klaus and Klijn (2005, 2007)
show that indeed responsiveness of couples’ preferences is often a necessary
condition for their results.
Because of the important role that responsiveness plays in two-sided match-
ingmarkets, onemaywonder if one could obtain stronger results for the student
placement problemswith couples if couples’ preferences are restricted to always
be responsive. However, since all proofs are designed in such a way that they
also apply if couples’ preferences are responsive, requiring that all couples’
preferences are responsive will not change any of our results.
An open problem: necessity and uniqueness
We have shown that pt-acyclicity of the priority structure is a necessary and, in
combination with strong pt-acyclicity of the induced partition, a sufficient con-
dition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism. The deter-
mination of further necessary conditions is an open problem. Consequently, we
were also not able to address the question of uniqueness for general placement
problems.
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Appendix: proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (a) Assume 	 violates acyclicity. Thus, there exists a
cycle, i.e., there exist distinct x, y ∈ X and i, j,k ∈ N such that the following two
conditions are satisfied:
cycle condition i 	x j 	x k and k 	y i and
c-scarcity condition there exist disjoint setsNx,Ny ⊆ N\{i, j,k} (possiblyNx =
∅ orNy = ∅) such thatNx ⊆ {l ∈ N : l 	x j},Ny ⊆ {l ∈ N : l 	y i}, |Nx| = qx −1,
and |Ny| = qy − 1.
We now construct a preference profile R ∈ R. We complete the proof by show-
ing that no fair and efficient mechanism exists.
First, we specify preferences in RS for all students s ∈ N. Let N0 ≡
N\[{i, j,k} ∪ Nx ∪ Ny].
(SP) Students’ preferences: Let s ∈ N and Rs ∈ RS be such that
196 B. Klaus, F. Klijn
if s ∈ N0, then 0 Ps . . . ,
if s ∈ Nx ∪ {j}, then x Ps 0 Ps . . . ,
if s ∈ Ny, then y Ps 0 Ps . . . ,
if s = i, then y Ps x Ps 0 Ps . . . , and
if s = k, then x Ps y Ps 0 Ps . . . ,
where the “tail” of any of the above preference relations, denoted by “. . .”, can
be any fixed linear order of the remaining position types.
Second, using the above specification of preferences for students, we specify
responsive preferences for all possible couples.
(CP) Couples’ preferences: Let c = (l,m) ∈ C. We specify Rc ∈ RRC such
that couple c’s preferences are responsive with respect to associated individual
preferences Rl and Rm that are as above. Let Rc ∈ RRC be such that6
if l,m ∈ N0, then (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ N0 and m ∈ Nx ∪ {j}, then (0, x) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ N0 and m ∈ Ny, then (0, y) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ N0 and m = i, then (0, y) Pc (0, x) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ N0 and m = k, then (0, x) Pc (0, y) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ Nx ∪ {j} and m ∈ N0, then (x, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ Nx and m ∈ Nx ∪ {j}, then (x, x) Pc (x, 0) Pc (0, x) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l = j and m ∈ Nx, then (x, x) Pc (0, x) Pc (x, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ Nx ∪ {j} and m ∈ Ny, then (x, y) Pc (0, y) Pc (x, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ Nx andm = i, then (x, y)Pc (x, x)Pc (x, 0)Pc (0, y)Pc (0, x)Pc (0, 0)Pc . . . ,
if l = j and m = i, then (x, y) Pc (0, y) Pc (x, x) Pc (0, x) Pc (x, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ Nx∪{j} andm = k, then (x, x)Pc(x, y)Pc(x, 0)Pc(0, x)Pc(0, y)Pc(0, 0)Pc. . . ,
if l ∈ Ny and m ∈ N0, then (y, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ Ny and m ∈ Nx ∪ {j}, then (y, x) Pc (y, 0) Pc (0, x) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l,m ∈ Ny, then (y, y) Pc (y, 0) Pc (0, y) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ Ny andm = i, then (y, y)Pc (y, x)Pc (y, 0)Pc (0, y)Pc (0, x)Pc (0, 0)Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ Ny andm = k, then (y, x)Pc (y, y)Pc (y, 0)Pc (0, x)Pc (0, y)Pc (0, 0)Pc . . . ,
if l = i and m ∈ N0, then (y, 0) Pc (x, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l = i andm ∈ Nx, then (y, x)Pc (x, x)Pc (0, x)Pc (y, 0)Pc (x, 0)Pc (0, 0)Pc . . . ,
if l = i and m = j, then (y, x) Pc (y, 0) Pc (x, x) Pc (x, 0) Pc (0, x) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l = i andm ∈ Ny, then (y, y)Pc (x, y)Pc (0, y)Pc (y, 0)Pc (x, 0)Pc (0, 0)Pc . . . ,
if l = i and m = k,
then (y, x)Pc(y, y)Pc(x, x)Pc(x, y)Pc(y, 0)Pc(x, 0)Pc(0, x)Pc(0, y)Pc(0, 0)Pc . . . ,
if l = k and m ∈ N0, then (x, 0) Pc (y, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l = k andm ∈ Nx∪{j}, then (x, x)Pc(y, x)Pc(0, x)Pc(x, 0)Pc(y, 0)Pc(0, 0)Pc. . . ,
if l = k andm ∈ Ny, then (x, y)Pc (y, y)Pc (0, y)Pc (x, 0)Pc (y, 0)Pc (0, 0)Pc . . . ,
and if l = k and m = i,
then (x, y)Pc(y, y)Pc(x, x)Pc(y, x)Pc(0, y)Pc(0, x)Pc(x, 0)Pc(y, 0)Pc(0, 0)Pc . . . ,
6 If qx = 1, then delete (x, x) from all couples’ preferences specified below. If qy = 1, then delete
(y, y) from all couples’ preferences specified below.
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where the “tail” of any of the above preference relations, denoted by “. . .”, can
be any fixed linear order of the remaining position type assignments that com-
plies with the responsiveness requirement induced by the associated individual
preferences.
Finally, we define R ∈ R such that single students have preferences as speci-
fied in (SP) and couples have preferences as specified in (CP).We now complete
the proof by showing that there is no fair and efficient mechanism ϕ. Suppose
to the contrary there is such a mechanism.
Step 1: We prove that for all l ∈ N0, ϕl(R) = 0.
Let l ∈ N0 ∩ S. By efficiency, ϕl(R) = 0.
Let l ∈ N0\S and assume that ϕl(R) = 0 and c = (l,m) (for c = (m, l)
interchange the roles of l and m). Recall that the couple’s preferences Rc are
responsive with respect to Rl,Rm ∈ RS. Thus, 0 Pl ϕl(R) implies (0,ϕm(R)) Pc
(ϕl(R),ϕm(R)). Since the null position is freely available, this contradicts effi-
ciency.
Step 2: We prove that for all l ∈ Nx, ϕl(R) = x.
Let l ∈ Nx and assume that ϕl(R) = x. Then, by efficiency, the definition of sin-
gle students’ preferences, and responsiveness of couples’ preferences, ϕl(R) = 0
and all position types x have to be assigned to students in [Nx ∪ {i, j,k}]\{l}.
Hence, there exist (at least) two distinct students in {i, j,k} whose allotment
equals x. Thus,
ϕj(R) = x or ϕk(R) = x. (1)
Let l ∈ Nx ∩ S. Since l 	x j 	x k, (1) violates student l’s priority (D3.2).
Let l ∈ Nx\S and c = (l,m) (for c = (m, l) interchange the roles of l and m).
If m ∈ N\{j,k}, then by responsiveness of Rc, (x,ϕm(R)) Pc (ϕl(R),ϕm(R)).
(Note that because there are at least two distinct students in {i, j,k}whose allot-
ment equals x, qx ≥ 2 and (x,ϕm(R)) ∈ X .) Since l 	x j 	x k, (1) violates
couple c’s priority (D3.3, a.1).
If m ∈ {j,k} and ϕm(R) = x, then by our definition of Rc, (x, 0) Pc (0, x) =
(ϕl(R),ϕm(R)). Since l 	x m, (1) violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, b.1).
If m ∈ {j,k} and ϕm(R) = x, then by responsiveness of Rc, (x,ϕm(R)) Pc
(ϕl(R),ϕm(R)). Let {m,m′} = {j,k}. Then, by (1), ϕm′(R) = x. Since l 	x m′,
ϕm′(R) = x violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, a.1).
Step 3: We prove that for all l ∈ Ny, ϕl(R) = y.
Let l ∈ Ny and assume that ϕl(R) = y. Then, by efficiency, the definition of sin-
gle students’ preferences, and responsiveness of couples’ preferences, ϕl(R) = 0
and all position types y have to be assigned to students in [Ny∪{i,k}]\{l}. Hence,
ϕk(R) = y and
ϕi(R) = y. (2)
Let l ∈ Ny ∩ S. Since l 	y i, (2) violates student l’s priority (D3.2).
Let l ∈ Ny\S and c = (l,m) (for c = (m, l) interchange the roles of l and m).
If m ∈ N\{i}, then by responsiveness of Rc, (y,ϕm(R)) Pc (ϕl(R),ϕm(R)).
(Note that because ϕk(R) = ϕi(R) = y, qy ≥ 2 and (y,ϕm(R)) ∈ X .) Since
l 	y i, (2) violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, a.1).
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If m = i, then by our definition of Rc, (y, 0) Pc (0, y) = (ϕl(R),ϕm(R)). Since
l 	y m, (2) violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, b.1).
Note that now only one position of type x and one position of type y is “left
to be assigned” to the students in {i, j,k}.
Step 4: We prove that ϕj(R) = x.
Suppose that ϕj(R) = x. Then, by efficiency, the definition of single students’
preferences, and responsiveness of couples’ preferences, ϕj(R) = 0, ϕi(R) = y,
and ϕk(R) = x.
Suppose j ∈ S. Since j 	x k, ϕk(R) = x violates student j’s priority (D3.2).
So suppose j ∈ N\S and let c = (j,m) (for c = (m, j) interchange the roles of
j and m).
If m ∈ N\{k}, then by responsiveness of Rc, (x,ϕm(R)) Pc (ϕj(R),ϕm(R)).
(Note that (x,ϕm(R)) ∈ X . If not, then qx = 1 and ϕm(R) = x, contradicting
m = k.) Since j 	x k, ϕk(R) = x violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, a.1).
If m = k, then by our definition of Rc, (x, 0) Pc (0, x) = (ϕj(R),ϕm(R)). Since
j 	x m, ϕk(R) = x violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, b.1).
Now only one position of type y is “left to be assigned” to either student i
or k. Hence, by efficiency, the definition of single students’ preferences, and
responsiveness of couples’ preferences, either [ϕi(R) = y and ϕk(R) = 0] or
[ϕi(R) = 0 and ϕk(R) = y].
Step 5: We obtain a contradiction.
Suppose i ∈ S. Suppose ϕi(R) = y and ϕk(R) = 0. Recall that k 	y i.
If k ∈ S, ϕi(R) = y violates student k’s priority (D3.2).
If k ∈ N\S, then let c = (k,m) (for c = (m,k) interchange the roles of
k and m). By responsiveness of Rc, (y,ϕm(R)) Pc (ϕk(R),ϕm(R)). (Note that
(y,ϕm(R)) ∈ X . If not, then qy = 1 and ϕm(R) = y, contradicting m =
i.) Since k 	y i, ϕi(R) = y violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, a.1). Hence,
ϕi(R) = 0 and ϕk(R) = y.
Note that xPiϕi(R). Since i 	x j, ϕj(R) = x violates student i’s priority (D3.2).
So suppose i ∈ N\S and let c = (i,m) (for c = (m, i) interchange the roles of i
andm). Ifm = k, then by (y, 0)Pc (0, y) and efficiency, ϕi(R) = y and ϕk(R) = 0.
Thus, by the construction of preference relationRc, (x, y)Pc(ϕi(R),ϕk(R)). Since
i 	x j and k 	y i, ϕj(R) = x and ϕi(R) = y violate couple c’s priority (D3.3, c).
Hence, m = k. Suppose ϕi(R) = y and ϕk(R) = 0. Recall that k 	y i.
If k ∈ S, ϕi(R) = y violates student k’s priority (D3.2).
If k ∈ N\S, then let c¯ = (k, m¯) (for c¯ = (m¯,k) interchange the roles of
k and m¯). By responsiveness of Rc¯, (y,ϕm¯(R)) Pc¯ (ϕk(R),ϕm¯(R)). (Note that
(y,ϕm¯(R)) ∈ X . If not, then qy = 1 and ϕm¯(R) = y, contradicting m¯ = i.) Since
k 	y i, ϕi(R) = y violates couple c¯’s priority (D3.3, a.1). Hence, ϕi(R) = 0 and
ϕk(R) = y.
If m ∈ N\{j,k}, then by responsiveness of Rc, (x,ϕm(R)) Pc (ϕi(R),ϕm(R)).
(Note that (x,ϕm(R)) ∈ X . If not, then qx = 1 and ϕm(R) = x, contradicting
m = j.) Since i 	x j, ϕj(R) = x violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, a.1).
If m = j, then by Step 4, ϕc(R) = (0, x). Since (x, 0) Pc (0, x) = ϕc(R), ϕ(R)
is not an efficient allocation. Alternatively, since i 	x j, ϕj(R) = x violates
couple c’s priority (D3.3, b.1).
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(b) Let N = {1, 2, 3} be such that C = {(1, 2)} and S = {3}, X = {x}, and qx = 1.
Let 	 be such that 1 	x 3 	x 2. Since |X| = 1, 	 is acyclic. Assume that ϕ is
fair and efficient. Consider R = (Rc,R3) ∈ R such that (0, x) Pc (x, 0) Pc (0, 0)
and x P3 0. Note that Rc ∈ RRC.
If ϕ3(R) = x, then ϕc(R) = (0, 0). Since 1 	x 3, (x, 0)Pc (0, 0) = ϕc(R) violates
couple c’s priority (D3.3, a.1).
If ϕ3(R) = 0, by efficiency, ϕc(R) = (0, x). Since 3 	x 2, x P3 0 = ϕ3(R)
violates student 3’s priority (D3.2). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.2 By Theorem 4.1 (a) we already know that acyclicity is
necessary for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism. So
assume 	 violates priority-togetherness, i.e., there exists c¯ = (i, j) ∈ C that is
priority-separated. Without loss of generality there exist x ∈ X and k ∈ N such
that
priority-separation condition i 	x k 	x j and
ps-scarcity condition there exists a set N¯x ⊆ N\{i, j,k} (possibly N¯x = ∅) such
that N¯x ⊆ {l ∈ N : l 	x j} and |N¯x| = qx − 1.
We now construct a preference profile R ∈ R. We complete the proof by show-
ing that no fair and efficient mechanism exists.
First, we specify preferences in RS for all students s ∈ N. Let N¯0 ≡
N\[{i, j,k} ∪ N¯x].
(SP) Students’ preferences: Let s ∈ N and Rs ∈ RS be such that
if s ∈ N¯0, then 0 Ps . . . ,
if s ∈ N¯x ∪ {i, j,k}, then x Ps 0 Ps . . . ,
where the “tail” of any of the above preference relations, denoted by “. . .”, can
be any fixed linear order of the remaining position types.
Second, using the above specification of preferences for students, we specify
responsive preferences for all possible couples.
(CP) Couples’ preferences: Let c = (l,m) ∈ C\{c¯}. We specify Rc ∈ RRC such
that couple c’s preferences are responsive with respect to associated individual
preferencesRl andRm as above. Without loss of generality, assume that qx > 1.
Let Rc ∈ RRC be such that7
if l,m ∈ N¯0, then (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ N¯0 and m ∈ N¯x ∪ {k}, then (0, x) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l ∈ N¯x ∪ {k} and m ∈ N¯0, then (x, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
if l,m ∈ N¯x ∪ {k}, then (x, x) Pc (0, x) Pc (x, 0) Pc (0, 0) Pc . . . ,
and in addition
(x, x) Pc¯ (0, x) Pc¯ (x, 0) Pc¯ (0, 0) Pc¯ . . . ,
where the “tail” of any of the above preference relations, denoted by “. . .”, can
be any fixed linear order of the remaining position type assignments that com-
plies with the responsiveness requirement induced by the associated individual
preferences.
7 If qx = 1, then delete (x, x) from all couples’ preferences specified below.
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Finally, we define R ∈ R such that single students have preferences as speci-
fied in (SP) and couples have preferences as specified in (CP).We now complete
the proof by showing that there is no fair and efficient mechanism ϕ. Suppose
to the contrary there is such a mechanism.
Step 1: We prove that for all l ∈ N¯0, ϕl(R) = 0.
Let l ∈ N¯0 ∩ S. By efficiency, ϕl(R) = 0.
Let l ∈ N¯0\S and assume that ϕl(R) = 0 and c = (l,m) (for c = (m, l)
interchange the roles of l and m). Recall that the couple’s preferences Rc are
responsive with respect to Rl ∈ RS and Rm ∈ RS. Thus, 0 Pl ϕl(R) implies
(0,ϕm(R))Pc (ϕl(R),ϕm(R)). Since the null position is freely available, this con-
tradicts efficiency.
Step 2: We prove that for all l ∈ N¯x ∪ {k}, ϕl(R) = x.
Let l ∈ N¯x ∪ {k} and assume that ϕl(R) = x. Then, by efficiency, the defi-
nition of single students’ preferences, and responsiveness of couples’ prefer-
ences, ϕl(R) = 0 and all position types x have to be assigned to students in
[N¯x ∪ {i, j,k}]\{l}. Hence,
ϕi(R) = x or ϕj(R) = x. (3)
Assume that ϕj(R) = x.
Let l ∈ [N¯x ∪ {k}
] ∩ S. Since l 	x j, ϕj(R) = x violates student l’s priority
(D3.2).
Let l ∈ [N¯x ∪ {k}
] \S and c = (l,m) (for c = (m, l) interchange the roles of l
and m).
Then, by responsiveness of Rc, (x,ϕm(R)) Pc (ϕl(R),ϕm(R)). (Note that
(x,ϕm(R)) ∈ X . If not, then qx = 1 and ϕm(R) = x. Hence, m = j. But then
c = c¯, i.e., l = i. Hence, i = l ∈ N¯x ∪{k}, a contradiction.) Since l 	x j, ϕj(R) = x
violates couple c’s priority (D3.3, a.1).
Hence, ϕj(R) = 0 and by (3), ϕc¯(R) = (x, 0). Since (0, x) Pc¯ (x, 0) = ϕc¯(R),
ϕ(R) is not an efficient allocation.
Step 3: We obtain a contradiction.
Step 2 implies that ϕk(R) = x and ϕc¯(R) = (0, 0). Since i 	x k, (x, 0) Pc¯ (0, 0) =
ϕc¯(R) violates couple c¯’s priority (D3.3, a.1). unionsq
Proof of Lemma 5.1 Recall that all quotas equal one. We prove Lemma 5.1 in
four steps. Steps 1 and 2 show that pt-acyclicity implies conditions (i) and (ii)
and Steps 3 and 4 show that conditions (i) and (ii) imply pt-acyclicity.
Step 1: “acyclicity ⇒ (i)”
Let 	 be acyclic and k ∈ {1, . . . ,p}. We prove that acyclicity implies (i.a) and
(i.b) for Sk.
Assume that (i.a) is violated for Sk. Suppose that |Sk| > 2, e.g., there exist
distinct i1, i2, i3 such that Sk={i1, i2, i3, . . .}⊆N\
⋃k−1
l=1 Sl.8 Since i1, i2, i3 ∈ Sk,
there exist distinct x1, x2, x3 ∈ X such that i1 = top(x1,N\
⋃k−1
l=1 Sl), i2 =
8 If k = 1, set ⋃k−1l=1 Sl = ∅.
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top(x2,N\⋃k−1l=1 Sl), and i3 = top(x3,N\
⋃k−1
l=1 Sl). Hence, i1 	x1 i2, i1 	x1 i3,
i2 	x2 i1, and i3 	x3 i1. Note that either i2 	x1 i3 or i3 	x1 i2. Thus, in contradic-
tion to acyclicity, either
[
i1 	x1 i2 	x1 i3 and i3 	x3 i1
]
or
[
i1 	x1 i3 	x1 i2 and
i2 	x2 i1
]
constitutes a cycle. Hence, (i.a) for Sk is implied by acyclicity.
Assume that (i.b) is violated for Sk. Suppose Sk = {i, j} and there exists x ∈ X
such that i = top(x,N\⋃k−1l=1 Sl) and j = top(x,N\[
⋃k−1
l=1 Sl ∪ {i}]). Thus, there
exists j′ ∈ N\[⋃k−1l=1 Sl ∪ {i, j}] such that j′ = top(x,N\[
⋃k−1
l=1 Sl ∪ {i}]). Hence,
i 	x j′ 	x j. Since j ∈ Sk, there exists y ∈ X such that j = top(y,N\⋃k−1l=1 Sl).
Hence, j 	y i. Thus, in contradiction to acyclicity, i 	x j′ 	x j and j 	y i consti-
tutes a cycle. Hence, (i.b) for Sk is implied by acyclicity.
Step 2: “pt-acyclicity ⇒ (ii)”
Let 	 be pt-acyclic. Hence, 	 is acyclic and by Step 1, Lemma 5.1 (i) (and
therefore Lemma 5.2) applies. Assume that there exists a couple c = (i, j) ∈ C
such that (ii) is violated. Then, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,p} such that [Sk = {i,m}
for m ∈ N\{i, j}] or [Sk = {j,m} for m ∈ N\{i, j}], or [Sk = {i} and there exists
k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,p}\{k − 1,k,k + 1} such that Sk′ = {j}].
First, assume that Sk = {i,m} form ∈ N\{i, j}. Let k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,p} be such that
j ∈ Sk′ .
If k < k′, then by Lemma 5.2 (b), for all x ∈ X, i 	x j and m 	x j. Since
i ∈ Sk, there exists y ∈ X such that i = top(y,N\⋃k−1l=1 Sl). Hence, i 	y m.
Thus, i 	y m 	y j and, in contradiction to priority-togetherness, couple c is
priority-separated.
If k > k′, then by Lemma 5.2 (b), for all x ∈ X, j 	x i and j 	x m. Since
m ∈ Sk, there exists y ∈ X such that m = top(y,N\⋃k−1l=1 Sl). Hence, m 	y i.
Thus, j 	y m 	y i, and, in contradiction to priority-togetherness, couple c is
priority-separated.
Second, assume Sk = {j,m} for m ∈ N\{i, j}. By interchanging the roles if i
and j in the proof abovewe again obtain a contradiction to priority-togetherness.
Third, assume that Sk = {i} and there exists k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,p}\{k − 1,k,k + 1}
such that Sk′ = {j}.
If k < k′, then k < k+ 1 < k′. Let m ∈ Sk+1. Then, by Lemma 5.2 (b), for all
x ∈ X, i 	x m 	x j, which contradicts priority-togetherness.
If k > k′, then k > k− 1 > k′. Let m ∈ Sk−1. Then, by Lemma 5.2 (b), for all
x ∈ X, j 	x m 	x i, which contradicts priority-togetherness.
Step 3: “(i) ⇒ acyclicity”
Let S satisfy (i). Then, Lemma 5.2 applies as well.
Let i1, i2, i3 ∈ N and x ∈ X be such that i1 	x i2 	x i3. Furthermore, let
k1,k3 ∈ {1, . . . ,p} be such that i1 ∈ Sk1 and i3 ∈ Sk3 . By Lemma 5.2 (a), k1 < k3.
Hence, by Lemma 5.2 (b), for all y ∈ X, i1 	y i3 and no cycles exist.
Step 4: “(i) and (ii) ⇒ priority-togetherness”
Let S satisfy (i) and (ii). Then, Lemma 5.2 applies as well.
Assume that priority-togetherness is violated, i.e., there exists a couple c =
(i, j) ∈ C,m ∈ N, and x ∈ X such that either i 	x m 	x j or j 	x m 	x i. Assume
that i 	x m 	x j (for j 	x m 	x i interchange the roles of i and j). Let i ∈ Sk and
j ∈ Sk′ . Lemma 5.2 (a) and i 	x m 	x j imply that k < k′. Hence, neither (ii.a)
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nor (ii.b) can be true. Thus, by (ii.c), k′ = k+ 1. Hence, Sk = {i} and Sk+1 = {j}.
Let l be such that m ∈ Sl. Since i 	x m 	x j, from Lemma 5.2 (b) it follows that
k < l and l < k + 1, a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2 Recall that all quotas equal one. Since ϕS is fair and effi-
cient (Theorem 5.1) it suffices to show uniqueness. So, suppose that ϕ is fair and
efficient. Let R ∈ R. We prove that ϕ(R) = ϕS(R). Let k ∈ {1, . . . ,p} be such
that Step k is well-defined in Definition 5.3. Assume that for all i ∈ ⋃l<k Sl,
ϕi(R) = ϕSi (R) (this is vacuously true for
⋃
l<1 Sl ≡ ∅). We prove that for any
student i ∈ N that is assigned his/her allotment ϕSi (R) in Step k ofDefinition 5.3,
it holds that ϕi(R) = ϕSi (R). We distinguish among the following cases:
(a) Sk = {s} and s ∈ S;
(b) Sk = {s}, s ∈ S, and Sk ∪ Sk+1 = {s, s′} such that c = (s, s′) ∈ C or
c = (s′, s) ∈ C;
(c) Sk = {s, s′}, s, s′ ∈ S, and
(c.1) top(Rs,Xk) = top(Rs′ ,Xk) or top(Rs,Xk) = top(Rs′ ,Xk) = 0;
(c.2) top(Rs,Xk) = top(Rs′ ,Xk) ≡ xˆ ∈ X and s 	xˆ s′;
(c.3) top(Rs,Xk) = top(Rs′ ,Xk) ≡ xˆ ∈ X and s′ 	xˆ s;
(d) Sk = {s, s′} and c = (s, s′) ∈ C or c = (s′, s) ∈ C.
Given allocation ϕ(R), x ∈ X ∪ {0}, and s ∈ N, (ϕ−s(R), x) denotes the allo-
cation obtained from ϕ(R) by replacing ϕs(R) by x, whenever this is feasible.
(a) Let xˆ ≡ top(Rs,Xk) = ϕSs (R). Assume ϕs(R) = xˆ. If xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X
and there is no i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = xˆ], then allocation α ≡ (ϕ−i(R), xˆ) Pareto
dominates ϕ(R), i.e., αs Ps ϕs(R) and for all p ∈ (S ∪ C) \{s}, αp Rp ϕp(R), con-
tradicting efficiency. So, xˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s} with ϕi(R) = xˆ. By
the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃kl=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s 	xˆ i. Since
ϕSs (R) = xˆ Ps ϕs(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority of s (D3.2); a contra-
diction. Hence, ϕs(R) = ϕSs (R).
Given allocation ϕ(R), x, y ∈ X ∪ {0}, and c ∈ C, (ϕ−c(R), (x, y)) denotes
the allocation obtained from ϕ(R) by replacing ϕc(R) by (x, y), whenever this is
feasible.
(b) Assume without loss of generality that c = (s, s′) ∈ C. Let (xˆ, yˆ) =
top(Rc,Xk) = ϕSc (R). Assume ϕc(R) = (xˆ, yˆ).
Suppose ϕc(R) = (yˆ, xˆ). Then, allocation α ≡ (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto domi-
nates ϕ(R), i.e.,αcPcϕc(R) and for all p ∈ (S ∪ C) \{c},αpRpϕp(R), contradicting
efficiency.
Suppose ϕc(R) = (x, yˆ) for some x = xˆ. If xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X and there is no
i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = xˆ], then allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R),
contradicting efficiency. So, xˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = xˆ.
By the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃k+1l=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s 	xˆ i. Since
(xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, yˆ), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the pri-
ority of c (D3.3, a.1); a contradiction.
Suppose ϕc(R) = (xˆ, y) for some y = yˆ. If yˆ = 0 or [yˆ ∈ X and there is no
i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = yˆ], then allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R),
contradicting efficiency. So, yˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = yˆ.
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By the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃k+1l=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s′ 	yˆ i. Since
(xˆ, yˆ) Pc (xˆ, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the pri-
ority of c (D3.3, a.2); a contradiction.
Suppose ϕc(R) = (x, xˆ) for some x = yˆ. If yˆ = 0 or [yˆ ∈ X and there is no
i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = yˆ], then allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R),
contradicting efficiency. So, yˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = yˆ. By
the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃k+1l=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s′ 	yˆ i. If xˆ = 0,
then since (xˆ, yˆ)Pc (x, xˆ), or equivalently ϕSc (R)Pcϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates
the priority of c (D3.3, a.2); a contradiction. If xˆ ∈ X, then since Sk = {s} and
Sk+1 = {s′}, s 	xˆ s′. Thus, since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, xˆ), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R),
allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority of c (D3.3, c); a contradiction.
Suppose ϕc(R) = (yˆ, y) for some y = xˆ. If xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X and there is no
i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = xˆ], then allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R),
contradicting efficiency. So, xˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = xˆ. By
the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃k+1l=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s 	xˆ i. If yˆ = 0,
then since (xˆ, yˆ)Pc (yˆ, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R)Pcϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates
the priority of c (D3.3, a.1); a contradiction. If yˆ ∈ X, then since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (yˆ, y),
or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority of c after
reallocation (D5.4, r.1); a contradiction.
Finally, suppose ϕc(R) = (x, y) for some x, y ∈ {xˆ, yˆ}.
If (xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X and there is no i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = xˆ]) and
(yˆ = 0 or [yˆ ∈ X and there is no i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = yˆ]), then alloca-
tion (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R), contradicting efficiency. So, there
is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [xˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = xˆ] or [yˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = yˆ].
By the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃k+1l=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), [if xˆ ∈ X and
ϕi(R) = xˆ, then s 	xˆ i] and [if yˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = yˆ, then s′ 	yˆ i].
If there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [xˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = xˆ] and yˆ = 0, then,
since (xˆ, yˆ)Pc (x, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R)Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the
priority of c (D3.3, a.1); a contradiction.
If there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [yˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = yˆ] and xˆ = 0, then,
since (xˆ, yˆ)Pc (x, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R)Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the
priority of c (D3.3, a.2); a contradiction.
If there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [xˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = xˆ] and yˆ ∈ X\{ϕl(R) : l ∈
N}, then, since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R)
violates the priority of c taking into account vacancies (D5.5, v.1); a contradic-
tion.
If there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [yˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = yˆ] and xˆ ∈ X\{ϕl(R) : l ∈
N}, then, since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R)
violates the priority of c taking into account vacancies (D5.5, v.2); a contradic-
tion.
If there are i, j ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [xˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = xˆ] and [yˆ ∈ X
and ϕj(R) = yˆ], then s 	xˆ i and s′ 	yˆ j. Thus, since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, y), or equiv-
alently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority of c (D3.3, c); a
contradiction.
Hence, to summarize Case (b), ϕc(R) = ϕSc (R).
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Given allocation ϕ(R), x, y ∈ X ∪ {0}, and i, j ∈ N, (ϕ−i,j(R), x, y) denotes
the allocation obtained from ϕ(R) by replacing ϕi(R) with x and ϕj(R) with y,
whenever this is feasible.
(c.1) Let xˆ = top(Rs,Xk) and yˆ = top(Rs′ ,Xk). If xˆ = yˆ = 0 and [ϕs(R) = 0 or
ϕs′(R) = 0], then efficiency is violated. Hence we can assume that xˆ = yˆ and
[xˆ = 0 or yˆ = 0].
Assume ϕs(R) = xˆ and ϕs′(R) = xˆ. If xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X and there is no i ∈ N
with ϕi(R) = xˆ], then allocation (ϕ−s(R), xˆ) Pareto dominates ϕ(R), contradict-
ing efficiency. So xˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′}with ϕi(R) = xˆ. By the induction
hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃kl=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s 	xˆ i. Since xˆ Ps ϕs(R), alloca-
tion ϕ(R) violates the priority of s (D3.2); a contradiction. Hence, ϕs(R) = xˆ or
ϕs′(R) = xˆ. Similarly, ϕs(R) = yˆ or ϕs′(R) = yˆ.
Suppose ϕs(R) = yˆ and ϕs′(R) = xˆ. Then, allocation (ϕ−s,s′(R), xˆ, yˆ) Pareto
dominates ϕ(R), contradicting efficiency. So, ϕs(R) = xˆ = ϕSs (R) and ϕs′(R) =
yˆ = ϕSs′ (R).
(c.2) Recall xˆ = top(Rs,Xk). Let yˆ = top(Rs′ ,Xk\{xˆ}). Note xˆ = yˆ.
Assume ϕs(R) = xˆ and ϕs′(R) = xˆ. If xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X and there is no i ∈ N
with ϕi(R) = xˆ], then allocation (ϕ−s(R), xˆ) Pareto dominates ϕ(R), contradict-
ing efficiency. So, xˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = xˆ. By Lemma 5.2
(b), s 	xˆ i. Since xˆ Ps ϕs(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority of s (D3.2); a
contradiction. Hence, either ϕs(R) = xˆ or ϕs′(R) = xˆ. Similarly, either ϕs(R) = yˆ
or ϕs′(R) = yˆ.
Suppose ϕs(R) = yˆ and ϕs′(R) = xˆ. Then, s 	xˆ s′ and xˆ Ps yˆ imply that ϕ(R)
violates the priority of s (D3.2); a contradiction. Hence, ϕs(R) = xˆ = ϕSs (R) and
ϕs′(R) = yˆ = ϕSs′ (R).
(c.3) An argument similar as in (c.2) shows that ϕs(R) = ϕSs (R) and ϕs′(R) =
ϕSs′ (R).
(d) Assume without loss of generality that c = (s, s′) ∈ C. Let (xˆ, yˆ) =
top(Rc,Xk) = ϕSc (R). Assume ϕc(R) = (xˆ, yˆ).
Suppose ϕc(R) = (yˆ, xˆ). Then, allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates
ϕ(R), contradicting efficiency.
Suppose ϕc(R) = (x, yˆ) for some x = xˆ. If xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X and there is no
i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = xˆ], then allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R),
contradicting efficiency. So, xˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = xˆ.
By the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃kl=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s 	xˆ i. Since
(xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, yˆ), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the pri-
ority of c (D3.3, a.1); a contradiction.
Suppose ϕc(R) = (xˆ, y) for some y = yˆ. If yˆ = 0 or [yˆ ∈ X and there is no
i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = yˆ], then allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R),
contradicting efficiency. So, yˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = yˆ.
By the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃kl=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s′ 	yˆ i. Since
(xˆ, yˆ) Pc (xˆ, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the pri-
ority of c (D3.3, a.2); a contradiction.
Suppose ϕc(R) = (x, xˆ) for some x = yˆ. If yˆ = 0 or [yˆ ∈ X and there is no
i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = yˆ], then allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R),
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contradicting efficiency. So, yˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = yˆ. By
the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃kl=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s′ 	yˆ i. If xˆ = 0,
then since (xˆ, yˆ)Pc (x, xˆ), or equivalently ϕSc (R)Pcϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates
the priority of c (D3.3, a.2); a contradiction. If xˆ ∈ X, then since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, xˆ),
or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority of c after
reallocation (D5.4, r.2); a contradiction.
Suppose ϕc(R) = (yˆ, y) for some y = xˆ. If xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X and there is no
i ∈ N with ϕi(R) = xˆ], then allocation (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R),
contradicting efficiency. So, xˆ ∈ X and there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = xˆ. By
the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃kl=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), s 	xˆ i. If yˆ = 0,
then since (xˆ, yˆ)Pc (yˆ, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R)Pcϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates
the priority of c (D3.3, a.1); a contradiction. If yˆ ∈ X, then since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (yˆ, y),
or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority of c after
reallocation (D5.4, r.1); a contradiction.
Finally, suppose ϕc(R) = (x, y) for some x, y ∈ {xˆ, yˆ}.
If (xˆ = 0 or [xˆ ∈ X and there is no i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = xˆ]) and
(yˆ = 0 or [yˆ ∈ X and there is no i ∈ N\{s, s′} with ϕi(R) = yˆ]), then alloca-
tion (ϕ−c(R), (xˆ, yˆ)) Pareto dominates ϕ(R), contradicting efficiency. So, there
is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [xˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = xˆ] or [yˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = yˆ].
By the induction hypothesis, i ∈ N\⋃kl=1 Sl. By Lemma 5.2 (b), [if xˆ ∈ X and
ϕi(R) = xˆ, then s 	xˆ i] and [if yˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = yˆ, then s′ 	yˆ i].
If there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [xˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = xˆ] and yˆ = 0, then,
since (xˆ, yˆ)Pc (x, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R)Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the
priority of c (D3.3, a.1); a contradiction.
If there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [yˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = yˆ] and xˆ = 0, then,
since (xˆ, yˆ)Pc (x, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R)Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the
priority of c (D3.3, a.2); a contradiction.
If there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [xˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = xˆ] and yˆ ∈ X\{ϕl(R) : l ∈
N}, then, since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R)
violates the priority of c taking into account vacancies (D5.5, v.1); a contradic-
tion.
If there is i ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [yˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = yˆ] and xˆ ∈ X\{ϕl(R) : l ∈
N}, then, since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, y), or equivalently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R)
violates the priority of c taking into account vacancies (D5.5, v.2); a contradic-
tion.
If there are i, j ∈ N\{s, s′} such that [xˆ ∈ X and ϕi(R) = xˆ] and [yˆ ∈ X
and ϕj(R) = yˆ], then s 	xˆ i and s′ 	yˆ j. Thus, since (xˆ, yˆ) Pc (x, y), or equiv-
alently ϕSc (R) Pc ϕc(R), allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority of c (D3.3, c); a
contradiction.
Hence, to summarize Case (d), ϕc(R) = ϕSc (R). 
Proof of Proposition 5.1 Suppose that ϕ is fair and efficient, but not vacancy-
fair onRR. Then there isR ∈ RR such that allocation ϕ(R) violates the priority
of c taking into account vacancies (D5.5). Let αl := ϕl(R) for all l ∈ N. Assume,
without loss of generality, that Definition 5.5 (v.1) applies. Hence, there exist
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x ∈ X, k ∈ N\{i, j}, and v ∈ X\{αl : l ∈ N} such that αk = x, i 	x k, and
(x, v) P(i,j) (αi,αj). By responsiveness of couple c’s preferences associated indi-
vidual preferences Ri,Rj ∈ RS exist for students i and j such that x Pi αi or
v Pj αj.
If x Pi αi, then by responsiveness, (x,αj) Pc (αi,αj); a violation of couple c’s
priority (D3.3, a.1). So, v Pj αj. But then, by responsiveness, (αi, v) Pc (αi,αj),
contradicting efficiency. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 5.3 Let 	 be a pt-acyclic priority structure that induces the
strongly pt-acyclic partition S = {S1, . . . ,Sp}. Let R ∈ R. In each step of
the sequential placement mechanism either a couple chooses its best pair of
available positions or a set of students obtain efficient allotments through the
deferred acceptance algorithm (because of the acyclicity the deferred accep-
tance algorithm allocation is an efficient allocation for the reduced placement
problem, see Ergin 2002, Theorem 1). Hence, there is an order σ(R) of the
students (i.e., single students and couples) associated with the execution of
the sequential placement mechanism such that ϕS(R) equals the allocation ob-
tained by applying the serial dictatorship implied by σ(R). Hence, ϕS(R) is
efficient.9
It remains to prove that ϕS(R) does not violate the priority of any single
student or any couple. Let k ∈ {1, . . . ,p} be such that Step k is well-defined in
Definition 5.8. Assume that ϕS(R) does not violate the priority of any single
student and any couple in
⋃
l<k Sl (this is vacuously true for
⋃
l<1 Sl ≡ ∅). We
prove that ϕS(R) also does not violate the priority of any single student and
any couple involved in Step k. We distinguish among the following cases:
(a) Sk ⊆ S;
(b) Sk = {s}, s ∈ S, and Sk ∪ Sk+1 = {s, s′} such that c = (s, s′) ∈ C or
c = (s′, s) ∈ C;
(c) Sk = {s, s′} and c = (s, s′) ∈ C or c = (s′, s) ∈ C.
(a) Let s ∈ Sk. By Definition 5.8, all position types that student s likes better
than ϕSs (R) are assigned to students in
⋃
l<k Sl or to other students in Sk. Since
all students in
⋃
l<k Sl have a higher priority for all position types (D5.6, ii),
ϕS(R) does not violate the priority of s because of any student in
⋃
l<k Sl. Fur-
thermore, since the allocation for students in Sk is obtained by applying the DA
algorithm, which always produces a fair allocation, to the reduced problem that
only contains students in Sk, ϕS(R) does not violate the priority of s because of
any other student in Sk. Thus, ϕS(R) does not violate the priority of s.
(b) Without loss of generality assume that c = (s, s′) ∈ C. Suppose ϕS(R) vio-
lates the priority of c. There are five subcases (see Definition 3.3) that we have
to distinguish for this violation. However, we only consider the first subcase,
Definition 3.3 (a.1), as the other subcases run analogously. There exist x ∈ X
and s˜ ∈ N\{s, s′} such that ϕSs˜ (R) = x, s 	x s˜, and (x,ϕSs′ (R)) Pc (ϕSs (R),ϕSs′ (R))
or (x, 0) Pc (ϕSs (R),ϕSs′ (R)). From Definition 5.6, (ii), s 	x s˜, and s˜ ∈ N\{s, s′} it
9 In Example 5.7, for instance, σ(R) = (5, 6, 7, (1, 2), (3, 4), 8) (in fact any sequence of students 5, 6,
and 7 at the beginning of the serial dictatorship is possible for this specific example).
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follows that (x,ϕSs′ (R)) and (x, 0) were available options at Step k. Apparently,
c was not assigned its most favorite position assignment according to qk, a
contradiction to Definition 5.8. Hence, ϕS(R) does not violate the priority of c.
(c) A similar argument as in (b) shows that ϕS(R) does not violate the priority
of couple c. unionsq
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